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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
STEPHEN HAYS ESTATE, Inc., a
Corporation of Utah, JULIA
HAYS HOGE, STEPHEN J.
HAYS, LAWRENCE J. HAYS,
MRS. LOU GOREY, MRS. ETHEL V. REILLEY and MARY
LOUISE O'DONNELL,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. 5302

Appellants' Answer to Petition
for Rehearing
Respondent's petition for rehearing IS inaccurate
from the very beginning. The opening sentence contains
a misstatement. It is not true that respondent "respectfully" petitions for a rehearing.
The court is under no obligation to convince the respondent. If the court decides the issues in accordance
with the law and the facts it has pc~rformed its entire
duty. Respondent in its brief attempts to usurp the
functions of the court and to determine the facts and
announce the law. It is for the court with all of the
evidence bdore it and a knowledge of the law, after
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considering the opposite contentions of the litigants to
define the true nature and legal effect of the action
brought by the respondent and to say who has "misconstrued" and ~who has "overlooked" and whether or
not the effect of the action brought by the respondent
would be to obtain title to copper solutions owned by the
appeHant. The court has the power and the duty to
protect its dignity and restrain its officers within the
bounds of decent respect and professional propriety,
and we cannot refrain from the suggestion that if the
lofty superiority manifest in the presentation of the respondent's contentions had been transmuted into an appreciation of the fundamental prineipl~::~s involved in this
controversy, it would have been more in keeping with
the dignity of the profession and the duty of the advocate, and there can be no mistake that the suggestion in
respondent's brief (page 74) that respondent is solicitous that the decision of the court "in this cause be understood and approved by all after sober analysis,"
while a generously professed suggestion, is in fact limited to a poignant urge that the decision be made to
conform to the interests and desires of the respondent.
The petition for r<>hearing filed by respondent is a
studied insult to the court and to the appellant and
strongly indicates the impossibility of respondent appreciating the significance and weight of facts or law
which would deny to it "a great industry," anything it
demands regardless of the rights of others whom respondent cannot refrain from describing as anything
but "an interloper" (page 7).
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\Ve turn to the points attempted to be raised by
the petition for rehearing.

I.
Respondent's point I. is not a point. It would make
absolutely no difference in this case whether respondent
dumped its overburden in the surrounding gulches as
waste or whether they entertained some intention that
the Almighty would cause meteoric waters to fall upon
the dumps and that they would give off into the surrounding country some solutions which respondent might
perchance collect. Respondent's purpose in this alleged
point is to attempt to take a general statement by the
Chief Justice, regardless of its materiality, and criticize
it in the hope that thereby the decision in this case may
be weakened. They feel that it is better to argue something, be it ever so immaterial, which they regard as
vulnerable rather than to attack the real questions in
the case.
However, the Chief Justice was right and respondent is wrong even in this immaterial matter. It is
clearly inferable from the record that this low grade
copper ore was dumped, at least originally, as waste,
with no thought of treatment to extract therefrom what
small quantities of copper were contained therein, exactly as the Chief Justice said.
Respondent's first dump, according to the record
in the case, was in Ingersol Gulch which was commenced
in 1907 (Abs. 124) and the first precipitating tank built
by respondent for the systematic commercial precipita-
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tion of copper was in 1927, the yc~ar following that in
which the dump in Dixon Gulch was commenced. J. D.
Schilling, mine superintendent of the Utah Copper Company, testified (Abs. 126) that this over·burden is placed
in these gulches "primarily to get rid of it and possibly
secondarily so we can treat them by tlw It-aching process.''
No one tE~stified that the occurrence of copper solutions in Dixon Gulch was as much the deliberately planned result of "plaintiff's elaborate preparation therefor
as the production of copper coneentrates is the carefully
calculated aceomplishment of plaintiff's milling operations" or that it is a "manufactured product as are the
concentrates from plaintiff's mills." No ·witness testified that plaintiff deposited material upon that site "for
the purpose of oxidizing and lc~aching it'' by processes
"for many years employNl successfully by plain tiff in
the leaching of i.ts many other dumps." Sueh stat<~mc•nts
by counsel in the petition for relwaring are not only at
variam~e with the rec·ord in this ease and a figment of
imagination, but are uttPrly lac~king in truthfuhwss, and
since re>spondent has seen fit to go outside of the rec·ord
for the purpose of misdesc·ribing this situation we take
the libc~rty of quoting the following from the 1928 report
of the Utah Copper Company ( h\·o years after the
dumps in Dixon Guleh were started) made to its stoekholders and the public~ (sec> page 9):
"In the last annual report mention was made
of the fact that the capping removed since inception of opPrations and deposited on surface ad-

Jmmng the mine had oxidized to a point where
meteoric waters were dissolving a very appreciable amount of copper. These percolating waters
average about 15 pounds of copper per thousand
gallons. There was leached in this way during the
year and deposited in improvised precipitating
plants 1,933,235 net pounds of copper at a cost of
6.2 cents per pound. Profiting by this experience,
a large central precipitating plant has been erected at a point low enough to receive all such water~
carrying copper in solution that are not tributary
to the smaller plants.
In connection with this it is interesting to
realize that the large yardage of capping, for·merly rejected as worthless, now promises a copper production of approximately one billion
pounds-assuming a 70«fo recovery as possible.''
We have examined th(~ annual n~ports of t~e plaintiff for many years prior to the institution of this action.
Though these reports contain references to removal of
"overburden," 'Yhich is also referred to as "stT·ippings"
and "cappings" and the reports of 1925, 192G and 1927
refer to "small tonnage" and "small poundage" recovered in form of precipitates from "m,ine waters," limit(~d to the open cut mine of the plaintiff, thPre is absolutely no reference to the dumps as a sourcE~ of possible
copper solutions, and all of these death-bed dE~clarations
whieh would make Hw dumps the principal source of
expected values is just so much attempt to read back
into the past an appreeiation of the dump, whieh n(~ver
existed and whieh was as mueh a :mrprise to the plaintiff as to c>veryone else in thP mining distriet and for
whieh thc> plaintiff ha(lllPWr tnkPn nny steps to prc>pare.
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So much for this alleged point and so much for the
value which may be placed upon such bold statements
of respondent. The floundering desire of rcespondent in
its present desperate straits to find some straw to grasp
should not lead those with short memories into attempting to take others to task for claimed inaccuracies. The
veil of charity should be drawn over this portion of
counsel's brief in the hope that it was said in ignorance.
In support of respondent's contention that respondent has always had in view the recapture of copper solutions, reference is made to Exhibit 36, a water filing
application in the office o-f the State Engineer, dated
June 11, 1926. It will be noted, however, and this is
significant, that the plaintiff hy that application sought
to file on its own water and not on public water, and
on such waters, not after such waters had entered the
land of anoth<~r, but on its own land and in its own
dump. No one in all the history of this litigation has
ever contended that the plaintiff does not have a right
to capture its own wat<~rs in its own dump, and it is only
because plaintiff now contends that it has a right to
capture the ddendants' watt~r on the dd<~ndants' land
that w<~ have this dispute. At the time exhibit BG was introduced counspl for plaintiff expressly repudiated any
suggrstion that they attempted to found any right thereon (see Abs. 200). No our has attempt<~d to limit plaintiff's right to captnn~ eopp<~r solutions ·\Yhile in the
dmnp. 'l'lw pm;itiou of tlw defendants has always been
that it made no diff<~rence what plaintiff intended as to
eoppt•r solutions, that thP law preclicatcs no rights on
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mere intention unconnectNl with capture and control.
I may intend anything I want with regard to water in
the clouds or descending from the clouds, and <~ven with
waters in my own land, but unless I capt1tre and control
the U)aters while in my land such intention in and of
itself amounts to absolutely nothing whatever. This
·whole matter is discussed on pag(~S 5 to 11 of "Respondent's Reply to Appellants' Reply Brief" and its reinsertion in the petition for rehearing is just thrashing
of old straws as to which we are entitled to an end.
\Vhen the filing in the office of the State Fjngineer,
Exhibit 36 (Abs. 342, 345) was offered in evidence by
plaintiff th(~ court sustained defendants' objection thereto as a basis of any right. Paragraph 9 of the filing is
in the record becausP defendants subsequently offered it
for the purpose of sho·wing that the exhibit indicates
that r(~spondent in 1926 understood the law to be that
respondent must capture any copper solutions it elaimed
while in its dump in ordPr to own them, and that they
then figured they could capture all of their waters on
their own land at the point of div<~rsion, th(~ west entrance to the drain tunnel. This old point is disenssed
at length in Respondent's Brief, pages 6 to 11, and in
Appellants' Reply to Respondent's Brief, pages :-lO to 33.

II.
Respondent's second point lS worded m; follows:
"The judgment in condemnation relates back to the order to occupy cnh~red .June 13, 1928 and hy that judgment no wat(~rs ·were nor (•ouhl any watPrs he eond<•mn-
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ed." Respondent reiterates its old saw that "all opinions in this case are that until the copper solutions had
crossed the boundary between the property of the plaintiff and that of defendants, title to these solutions was
in plaintiff." Title in what sense'? The right to capture
on its ovYn ground the waters therein and to exclude
others from its own ground. The same right appellants
have and ~which they assert in this action. Respondent
has never squarely faced and always evades this issue.
Title to water is not an absolute, unqualifiPd one, as is
ordinarily the case with property, but has that peculiar
inherent, ineradicable quality ~whieh attaches to water,
its migratory incident whieh limits mYnership to the
right to capture and take into possession while on one's
property and burdened with the penalty of a termination
of ownership the instant it leaves such property. It is
also true that the order of eondemnation entered on
.June 13, 1928 cmtld not aff.ect title to any water-. Plaintiff's pleadings do not eover tit]P to watN and the trial
eourt hns n~pudiatecl any pnrpose of giving plaintiff
title to water; and plaintiff should he compelled to stand
on its plPaclings and on its declaration and should not be
permitted to a(•quire wat(•r through aequiring land. If
~we forget for a moment that this controversy concerus
water in \Yhich there is a small quantity of copper,
which is immaterial as far as the law of waters is concerned, and considPr tlw situation of an ordinary controversy about water, would a person at a higher level
through ~whosP ground water must percolate or flow be
pPrmitted for one instant to urgP to a court that he had
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a right to condemn thE~ land of a neighbor at a lower
level from which he intended to take water in the future
because the water he would take in the future was not
at the time of filing the suit in the land sought to be
condemned o? There can be no question that such a suggestion would have any support from the authorities or
the court. vYhEm the order of condemnation was entered
on June 13, 1928 even on the theory of the respondent
there were certain solutions then in the tract condemned
which belonged to the appellant. \Ye make no particular
point as to the value of these solutions, their value is
negligible, but in that instant there was potentially in
the tract which rc~spondent was attempting to condemn
all of the water which in all of the years to come will
reach that particular tract, and it was this water acquiring capacity that the plaintiff was attempting to secure,
\Yithout paying anything for it. Tjand docs not produce
water in any sense, so that it is poor science and poor
logic for plaintiff to urgP that the dumps produc~e an~r
\Yater. The dumps produce no more water than did the
drainage district prior to the location of the dumps. Respondent in its brief says, ''On .T nne 1:1, 1928 when plaintiff by court order was put in possession of thE> easement it sought to condemn, title to the solutions yet to
eross that property was in plaintiff." This statement
as a matter of fact and of law is inaccurate and highly
mislPading. Only an infinitPsimal part of thP solutions
were thrn owned by the plaintiff in that limited sense
only in which solutions may be ownE•d-thc right to caphue on one's own land. Practically all of such solu-
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tions which were yet to cross that property existed only
in potential character, the elem<mts being scattered almost throughout the universe. Someday through laws
of nature moisture would be created, precipitation would
take place upon the water shed which wat<~r would find
its way by seepage and percolation into appellants' land.
Respond<~nt by its action seeks to preempt and patent
for its exclusive ownership the laws of nature and these
products, and to appropriate to itself those processes
and bounties. It is ridiculous to talk about the respondent owning all of these solutions at the instant the order
of condmnnation was signed. As respondl'nt says, they
were not all in existenc0 in th0 dump, and whl'n for a
brief time they mingled with the materials in the dump
respondt>nt would have the opportunity of capturing
them on its own land, hut only for that brief time, and
only during such brief moments would rnspond0nt have
any kind of own('rship, and the instant such waters crossed into appellants' land appellants would have the same
fleeting opportunity of capture and p(~rfedion of mYnership. Rc•spondent could not acquire by condemnation
of app<~llantli' land a right to (•apture solutions which
respondeut had failed to eaptnre on its own land and
which could only have a real ownership by capture awl
would belong to the ownPr of the land in whi(•h it was
captured. Respondent should be eompelled to eat its
own theory. 'l'hat theory is that respondent is not by
this adion att0mpting to quiet title to waters but only
to land. Respondent (•an not,
or fad thP right to

then•fon~,

cnptun~

acquire in la \\"

wat<•r aft("!' the same
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leaves its land. ~What respondent is attempting to do is
to avoid the limitation on the ownership of water, which
restricts the right to capture to one's own land, by acquiring the right to capture water mYned by the appellant because such water actually is captured on appellants' land, whereas it never has been captured in respondent's land.
This alleged second point is an old friend. It has
been with us from the beginning. It has been thrashed
back and forth until it is threadbare. The defect, as we
think, in respondent's position is that respondent refuses
to recognize the fact that owrwrship of water of this
character is not absolute, but qualified and is bound
by strong legal ties to the owner of the land through
~which it is passing. A man cannot say that he owns
\\'ater unless he reduces it to possnssion and controls it
upon his premises, and it is a figment of the imagination to suggest that the respondent has r0duced to possession meteoric waters which fall on the dump and then
permitted to escape into adjoining land. Such waters
are at all times on their way to he owned in the absolute
sense only by thos~) who capture thC'm in a literal and not
in a figurative sense. Other~wise vYe an) reduced in the
last analysis to a conclusion that waters belong to the
owner of the land at the highest elevation in the water
shed, and that such highest owner may suceessfully condemn the land of all lower owners and eapture waters
thereon simply on proof of probability that such waters
fall on awl pass through his land. Such a doctrine has
no plaee in the law. You cannot apc>x water.
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~Whether

appPllants have or lwvP not th0 right to
compel the contimwd passage of these ~waters is not in
this case, and we sec 110 reason for crossing that bridge•
in this case, but it is important and vital that the fundamental doctrine of the law relating to waters that it is
migratory and not stationary, the same as wild animals
and other liquids and gases, and is mvned only in a qualified sense, ~which is principally a right to capture on
one's own ground and not absolutely until actually reduced to possession be adhered to, and sueh fundamental
law ought not to be overthrown simply because "a great
industry" regards ih; neighbor on a lower level ~who
elaims equal right to water on its lands, as an "interloper." This being tru0, an order giving respondent
possession of appellants' land without prejudiee and
only until a determination of the issues, does not change
the ownership of th<~ \Yater coming into appellants' land
any more than it ehanges the ownership of the land.
Land and water arc one. App0llants ask for no different title to the water than they are willing to eoncedl\
to the respondent, hnt insist upon equality. It is coneeivable that a l'itnation might arise where the
dc~nt

would own a dump at a lo\ver level than souw otiH•r

dump at a higher level owned by some
dent if

othc~r

mining

w<~

ean eoneeive the indignation of respon-

n•quin~d

to dc·fencl itself against the argumcuts

eompany and
usc~d

n~spon

hy respondent in this

ease~

were the ownc•r of the

dump at a higher levd attempting to eondemn rcspond<'Jlt's clump. "There should he nothing 1wenliar ahont
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the law applicable to its (Dixon Gulch) waters." (P. 39
of the Petition for Rehearing).
The law is the same as to all, great and small, above
and below, as to such migratory elements. The order of
condemnation did not change th<~ relations of the parties
at all as far as title to water is concerned. The respondent still had the right to capture the water in its dump
and still lost such right to that \Vater as soon as it passed
from respondent's dump. The respondent by the order
of possession without prejudice preliminarily and only
until the matter was determined by the court was given
the right to go upon appellants' land and as a trustee,
under the duty to act as the court should hold if the order
of condemnation was not in accordance with law, and in
such capacity to take possession of the water in appellants' land. Otherwise, the order of condemnation becomes exactly what respondent repudiates, a transfer of
title, and which respondent admits could not be its legal
effect.
Respondent says "we do not desire, it is not our
purpose to acquire title to the coppnr solutions owned
by the appellants," but the reply of the court is, "it
makes no diffenmce what you declare your desire or
purpose to be, the legal effect of upholding your contention is to transfer title of copper solutions belonging
to the appellants to the respondent, if we uphold the
right of the respondent to condemn the land of the appellants and collect the copper solutions on appellants'
land.''
It has al-ways S(~emed to us a mockery of justice to
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suggest that the order of condemnation was equivalent
to the miracle of the Red Sea whereby the waters seeping and percolating from higher levels to lower levels
were for that magical instant of the signing of the decree
stopped in th<~ir course and Tract D became bone dry
so that the condemner stood on nothing but earth and
having acquired only the dry land, so as to cause the
waters which thereafter came from the higher level to
belong to th<~ condemner thereof. \V e know of no deeision supporting any such doctrine and not a single
case from any court so holding has respondent been able
to produce, and as stated before, the logic of tmch a law
would b<~ to ultimatt>ly and finally decree the ovvnership
of water to be in tlw person at the highest level so that
he could by the tric·k of conclmnnation aeqnire Uw right
to follmv the water once in his land when:ver it might
go, under the fidion that at the instant the orclt~r of condemnation is being signed the natural laws governing the
downward emus<~ of ~watPr are suspended and thereby
the conclemrwr acquires only land, so that the right to
water ::mbs<~quently appearing in the condemned land
eontinuc~s in the cond\·mner then~of, sueh water being
there eaptmed physically and actually for the first time.
Such a sophistry in our judgment sweeps away the very
foundatio11 of the law of water rights, and all migratory
substances.
Respondent prd<>nds to find difficulty in the suggestion of tlw Chid .Justice that the effect of upholding
the right of condemning in this ease would be to condPlllll watc'r heeause, says n~spondPnt, the water which
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it is claimed would be condemned under such circumstances are not y<~t in existence. This is equivalent to
saying that when a person condemns a piece of land
because of the water right attached to the land, they
should be required to pay only for the land and the
water physically in the land at the instant of condemnation, because the water which ·will be in the land next
year is now in the ocean or in the clouds or it may be
in land far distant at a higher elevation. \Vhen you
condemn land to collect water on the land you condemn
the capacity of the land to aequire water and that capacity exists, not in the actual pres<>nce of water at the
instant of condemnation, but in tho probability that
water naturally and according to the laws of gravitation
will reach such land, and can there be captured or used,
and the condemnation action in this case is subject to
no different incident.
The respondent pretends to suggest that it is possible to shut off the copper solutions before they reaeh
the appellants' land. On the trial the respondent took
two inconsistent positions on this question. It was first
suggested that it would be easy and comparatiwly inexpensive so to do, and whPn the appellants then argued
that if it was easy and comparatively inexp<msive then
their good faith in seeking thiR relief was open to question, respondent took the other stand and insisted that
it would be from an <~ngineering standpoint impossible
to shut off the solutions, both beeause of the expense and
berause of the fact that the waters were seeping and
perrolating, and henc<• fliffuRed and not Ruhj<>d to col-
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lection. Now, in thrir petition for a rehearing, we have
the argument that because the court has announced a
doch·ine as old. as the hil1s that you 1nust eapture
water on your own land before it is yours, that in this
particular case, because this universally applicable lavv
applies to the respondent, that since th(~y could do this,
therefore, the court should uphold the order of condemnation because it would bP an idle thing to compd n•spondent to actually run the tunnel to the face of its
dump and th<~re collect the waters. The trouble with
the argument is that the owner of water does not C<~ase,
by n~ason of the fact that the court may point out how
the respondent may not lose title to water, to lose title
by permitting the vYater actually to <~scape into tlw lan<ls
and premises of others. If n~spondent can so easily capture the water upon its own premises, let it do so
and end the controversy. 'l1 he very n~ason it has
sought this remedy is because, as stated in the argument
under Point V, tlwre were waters in tlw gulch before
th<~ dump was placed therr, which obviously are not from
the dump and cannot, th<~refore, be captured in the dump.
The vvaters in Dixon Gnleh are not all from this "reduction worb;" as now fina1ly admitt<~cl in Point V-just
as apprllants han~ always contended-an<l for this reason they have sought to take appellants' land inst<~ad of
capturing their portion of such eomingh•d waters upon
their own land, as thry now say it will be merely a gr:,;ture to do. \Y e invite this Rolution of the problem.
It may produce cold chills of horror down the back
of !hP rPspo])(kut hut thP law is that PVPry drop of \YatPJ'

17
reganllc>ss of wheth<~r it be blessed with some copper or
cursed with sulphur or salt, is held only by a defeasible right and the ownership of the respondent is strictly
limited by the necessity of physically capturing and controlling the same while it is actually in the dump. Each
particle of wat<~r has stamped on it by fundamental lmv
the basic scientific doctrine of evolution - use me
now at least to th<~ extent of actually capturing me
while on your land, or lose m<:~. Each drop of water in
respondent's dump is ticketed for an ultimate destination beyond the ownership of the respondent and unless
it is actually captured this right of ownership is actually
lost.
After having taken the coppPr solutions of the defemlauts for ov<~r six years and excluding the defendants from the possibility of tlwmselvPs taking their
own copper solutions on their own ground, it comes with
poor claim from the illegal appropriators to suggest
that the owner of th<~ copp<~r solutions would nc>ver have
used them anyway. Hespondent is obs<~ssed with the
strange hallucination that to get an order of oeeupancy
is the end of eontroversy, wh<~reas in fact an order of
occupancy in a ease of eminent domain is one which the
condemner is under strict duty of justifying. For this
purpose a bond is requirt>d, so that in caR<~ the order is
not legally issued the ownPr of the property ·will b<~ abl<~
to seeure damages arising from the condud of the plailltiff \vhih~ lw under authority of lav\- oeeupies the propPrty. 'l'he occupier is a trustee. He must account for all
that lw dop~; and everything that he take:-;. If the <'otut
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holds, as it has in this case, that the property cannot be
condemned, and in the meantime the occupier has taken
from the premises valuable property of the owner, he
must respond in damages. The order of occupancy does
absolutely nothing in the way of interfering with title
and it is idle for the respondent to suggest that an order
secured ''without prejudice'' had the effect of transfering title to solutions then or thereafter to be in the defendants' land, which the plaintiff admits would have
belonged to the defendants had the order not been entered. It is a beautiful theory, but we have never felt
that it could impose itsPlf upon the court.
\Ve sympathize deeply with the inability of the respondent to r<~concile the opinion of the eourt in this
ease with respondent's theory. The pain which respondent feels in this matter is due to the fact that respondent has never been able to admit wisdom, logic, or law
in any position that did not support respondent's contentions. 'l'ht> perplexity ·which respondent professes
does not arise from the absence of either elear statement,
sound logic, or abundant authority in support of the
opinion of the court, hut because that opinion does not
support the position of respondent. This difficulty is
inherent and int~radicahle and if re:-;pondent ·would reeognize this necessary divergence and its ineseapablP
quality, it would :-;ooner show a respectful attitud<' toward the functions of the court and recognize that when•
court and counsel differ, it is the court and not counsf'l
that decides.
In the dee is ion of this court, discussc>d on pagP ] 2
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of Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, respondent is
confronted vvith the proposition that eminent domain
does not permit the respondent to take appellants' land
for the purpose of doing exactly what the appellants
have the right to do and will do. In other words, eminent
domain is not for the purpose of monopolizing mining
and is not operative to exclude the appellants so that the
respondent enn take values which appellants have the
right to tah. Again we have the argument that respondent could not rightly be ht>ld to he attempting to interfere with the right of the appellants to collect eopper
solutions in the future because such copper solutions
were not in c~xistence at the time the order of occupancy
was entt>red, but that the order of occupancy would permit the rt>spon<lent to collect such copper solutions in
the future on the land of th~~ defendants when such copJWr solutions reach such land in the future. There is a
failun~ on the part of respondent to recognize that what
the court is dealing with is a right to collect and not with
actual, specific, identified, actualizt>d drops of water.
This is because of the~ peculiar eharaetnr of rights in
water, as hereinbefore discussed. Rt>spondent again refers to its contention that the owner of Tract D can have
no right to a continued flow as to the future~ c•opper
solutions fro111 a higher level. Defendants are not asking
in this emw for a right to a eontinued flow. A right to
a c~ontimwcl flow was not an issue in this ease. It is a
right to eo11Pct on their land the water that actually pereolates aml appears then•. Appellants claim the ownership of a pn•se11t right

c~xtc•nding

through all time to
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collect waters that percolate, ~eep, or flow in Trarts C
and D, and it is this right that the respondent is attempting to take away and is attempting to support by the
sophistry that the court cannot deal with the right to
collect 1vater in the futurP because the water is not now
in the~ land. \Ve defend no rights diffenmt from tho~<~
of the plaintiff and we demand a recognition of the samo
rights in our own land. This issue is presc>nted by appellants' answer and has been raised at C'Very opportunity, and the la\\- is without dissent, as arguc~d in the>
briefs heretofore presented.
'rhe respondent is unable to see, so respondent says,
what the court refers to in its opinion where it is helcl
that eminent domain will not he operative where property is "being held or devoted to a public usc• by one
person," and "may not be taken by eminent clomain
proeec~dings, as a general rule, by another to be nsecl
for the ~ame purpose in the same manner." Is it, says
the respondent, the "ea~ement" or the "c·opper solutions" to which the court refc~rs as being at presc>nt
us eel g And respondent Rays, "we think it should IH•
elcar that it is not copper solutions, because• there wer<·
none." Perhaps the court might take the responclc~nt ai
its o1vn word, and permit the respondc•nt to comktml
the dry land at 'rraet D, hut not to collect any solntion:-:
on or in that tract but to turn such solutions owr to tlJ<•
clc~fendants. The respondent would promptly reqtwst a
darification of such an order so as to permit it to eollec·1
and take appellants' water for itsPlf. 'I' he> sallw is
tnw with n'gard to t}w ~mggestc~d 1mcPrtaiuty as to thu
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easement. Of course, with regard to the easement, "no
one had theretofore suggested that the public use for
which Tract D was being ht'ld by tho defendants was the
conveyance of the plaintiff's solutions from plaintiff's
dumps to defendants' facilities, there to be appropriated by defendants, and that that prospective 'publie
use' precluded plaintiff's condemnation of such an easement for the conveyance of the solutions plaintiff had
produced to plaintiff's facilities, the result of its industry and investment to be thereby retained as its own."
No one has suggested such a proposition because the
entire suggestion is simply an absurd concoction of. the
respondent, and is easily resolved and dissipated by the
basic fact that solutions in Tract D never have, do not
no\\T, and never will belong to or be owned by the plaintiff. They inhere in and are a part of Tract D, and the
right to capture and control is the very essence of the
ownership of Tract D.
Tracts C and D were, however, being used by appellants at the time of the commencement of this action for
the passage of appellants' solutions, with thE~ ch~ar, unahandoned and unforfeited right of eapture by appellants, whieh is exactly what respondent desires to take
away and use for exactly the ~;;am(~ purpose.
\Ye respectfully suggest that the eonrt should not
fpe} any n~sponsihility for the professed incapacity of
the l'(~spond(•nt to comprehend the proposition that while
the respond(•nt has always professed that it was not attemptiug in any degree to acquire~ title to <'Opper solutions by thP condemnation of the defendants' land that
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in law and in fact such would be the effect of the success
of the respondm1t in this case. It makes no difference
what respondent declares. \Ve are not interested in the
name that respondent shall give to what it is attempting
to do. The question is what would be the aetual and the
real effect of condemning Tract D under the guise of a
mere easement and turning it over to respondent to colh~et copper solutions therein. If plaintiff's success in
its efforts would not be in legal effect and reality a
transfer of title to copper solutions in Tract D there is
no such thing as ownership of water and the appellants
in this case in turn could legally seek an order condemning an easement into respondent's dump to there colled copper solutions on the theory that such solutions
are not nmv in existence and, therefore, cannot now belong to rpspondent, since the right to collect solutions
would lw iu IW way associated with the ownership of
land; aud appellants could in turn say that a decision
. of a question which does not conform to the views of
the re:,;pon<lent is incomprehensible to n~spondent and
''we must say, with all due respect, is beyond our comprehension, as we think it will be beyond the understanding of all others who may be called upon to analp;(•
or constnw this opinion." This is not the law relating
to water and we arc sure will never become such.
\Vhen we read respondent's analysis "pleadings j n
this case and eonsidering the issue raised,'' we are n•minded of a statement by the late Senator Ben Tillman
of South Carolina in the Senate of the United Stat<~~;,
whPn lw 1<aid "I do not eare how much the eolored man
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votP::;, just so you let the white man count tlw vot<~::;." H
is an idlc> thing to have pleadings if \H~ are to permit the
n~::;pondent to bP the only one to interpret them. 'l'he
affirmative ans\Yer of the defendants covers pages GG to
(i4 of th<~ Abstraet. It is not confined to the issue that
the watPr claimed by the ddendants arise::; from distant
and dec·p subtl•rTanPan som·<·es, (though a geologi<·al
i::;sue raised hy the dd<~ndants made such a contention),
but in the pleadings the irreducible issue always insist<·d
upon was that from whatever original sources the ~wat<•rs
eanw when they a(•tually reaelwd 'l'ract D they wer<' ownt>d by the defendants. (See paragraphs XII and XIII of
defendants' answer, Abs. 47-51, and the further answer
and count<~relaint set forth at pages G6 to G4). 'I' he real
issue was that ownPrship \Yas not confilH'd to origin but
to location when captured, and the suggestion that there
was no issue that the defendants intended to use 'L'raet D
for the same purpose that the n•s]1ond<~nt would use it, is
utterly false. Tract D aud 'I'ra.et C, as we will point out
und('r another heading of this brief, are both of the!ll
s itu~l tPd strat<'gieally at the a nly point where a ppt~llants'
wate1·s <'all he

<'Oll<~et('d

in Dixon (}uleh on defPndants'

ground, and Uw respondent is attempting to mislead ill<~
court in its sugg<•t>tion that the objection made by th<>
appellantt' in this aetion is not and has not always he<>ll
thai tlH• n•spondent \Yas not att<~mpting to obtain nn
<~a:c:<'tlH'Jtt

l>ut that such atte111pt was merely a guise undPr

\':hidt th<~y \n~n~ att<~mpting to acquire the only land on
,., llid1 npp('l]ants' solutions ean be captured in Dixon
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Gulch, and thus actually get for itself these waters by
taking appellants' land.
It is a misstatement as to the position of the court
for respondent to say in its brief (page 21) that the
opinion of the court must be founded on a contention
that "the solutions here involved were th<~ result of a
comingled supply from many unknown sources, coming
to the surface of defendants' property within Tract D
from subterranean and unknown sources." It is title,
not source, that was the principal bone of contention on
the trial, though most of the tim<~ was spent on geological issues not involved in the appeal; and title was not
depcmll'nt upon source. Anu the suggestion that th<~ defense pleadeu to the taking of Tract D was not that th('
defendants intenueu to put 'l'ract D to the same use a:-;
respondent is also inaccurate. Among other places see
defendants' answer, page 62 of the Abstract, as follows:
wrhat if the plaintiff is permitteu to conuemn and to
usc aml occupy the ucfcndants' saiu property, as set
forth in plaintiff's complaint * * * plaintiff will damage
the uefcnuant in many thousanus of uollars * * * aJHl
will prevent uefcndant from collecting its waters in said
gulch containing copper in solution and extrading tlw
(•opper therefrom • * • "

III.
Point three is bas<~d on the fact that plaintiff ha:s
ousted defendants during six years from the possibility
of collecting the defendants' copper solutions in Dixon
Gnlf'h, and say:,; therpfore dcf<mdants should not he JWl'-
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mittcd to assert that defendants intend to usc the Tracts
C and D for the same purpose plaintiff would use them,
and thcrefon~ plaintiff ought to be permitted to exercise the right of eminent domain; that the likelihood of
defendants collecting copper solutions in Dixon Gnleh
is very remote and the court should not refuse the Pxercise of th0 power of eminent domain simply because the
owm~r of land may at some remote and indefinite and
uncertain time desire himself to use the land for a puhli<·
purpose.
Respondent goes outside of the n~cord to say that
the Valentine Scrip was entered as an agricultural an<l
not a mineral entry, but it makPs no difference. Under
the law th<'n existing, which rights are now pn~s<>rw~d,
the mineral rights belong to the patentee, and no issue~
was presented with reference then'to for decision by llw
eourt. Respondent says (page 24 of its brief) "Under
tlH~ findings in this case which this eourt has affirme<l,
\\'ere a dam to be construc-ted across Dixon Guleh on
lwdroek, 'rraet D would forthwith lweome dry, all copper
solutions would lH~ held back on plaintiff's property, and
all members of this eourt agree that plaintiff has tlw
right at any tinw to mak<~ any diversion or disposition
of thos<> solutions on plaintiff's property vlaintiff may
dt>sirP. 'rlmt faet in our opinion preeludes a11y rPal or
serious int<~ntion on the part of the defendants tlwnlselves to tn'a t these solutions." 'rhis has nothing to do
with tlw <keision of this ease. \Y e have already in this
bric~r anrl in llw origim1l briefs discussed the souree of
tlw watn and the possibility of shutting it off. Thi,.;
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comingled source is at last admitted by n~spondcnt in
discussing Point V, but it makes no diff(~rence ·what respondent may or may not do in the future. Dcfendm1t''
good faith is not open to question, and their expressed
intention and future conduct vvill determine whether tlw
inte11tion of the defendants to collect copper solution.-:
on deft~ndants' property is ''a mere gesture.'' '['he colludion of copper solutions by tlw defendants is not "conting(~nt, unet~rtain or Jll'oblematic," it is absolute and
eedain. Ev<~r sinee the faet of eomrnercial value in tlw
eopper solutions in Dixon Gulch has bet~n kno>vn hy tlw
ddPIHlants they have intended to at onee capture them
and it is only because of the illegal and unwarranted intnfen·ncn of th<:> plai.ntiff that this has not been done.
Th<• east~s cited by respoudeni ·with reference to this
mat Lu r are not in point. 'rtwy refer to the condemnation
Jll'OJl<~riy heiug held by a person who was not tiH'il
using tlw same Jor vuhlic ns<', or where sueh public US<'
n·asmwllly <~mdd not lw contemplated in thf~ imlllediat('
l'utun~. H i\'Otlld l.w interesting to have counsel tind
sm1w t'a"'' wlwrc a mining company had condemnetl tht•
lllining gT()tllld of another mining company to remov<·
tlw value;.; tllerdt·om for mining purpos<)S. The authoriii(':.; t•il('<l by appl'llaut~ at pages 111 to 119 of "HriPE
of "\pp<•llants" are direetly in point, and a compll'iP
au..:'.\'<'1' to this question.

or

No question of abandonment hy tlefendants of tht>se
watr•rs or of forfeiture of their right thereto has ('Ver
lwen nmde in this ease either by pleading or othPrwi:-:e.
( ln tht• <·outrary I'('Spo!Hl<'llT has throughout eoneedefl
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that solutions and waters which were in the premises up
to the time of their taking by respondent belonged to
defendants.

IV.
Respondent's point IV is the newest thing in the
petition for rehearing. This is a complet<~ departure
from the theory upon which plaintiff based its case,
diametrically opposed to the evidence presented, and
destructive of any possiblE' re>li<>f for plaintiff in this
case.
The point is:

"If the law of \Va tc~r applies, then it should
be governed by the law of public waters.''
~Why

should there he any question as to the law of
waters applying'! Plaintiff seeks to condemn a ditch
within whieh to eourse 1Dater·s. If there is any question
about the law of wat0rs applying, then rP:-;pondent has
no standing in eou rt at all, beca us<' t lw vt>ry <·ondcenmation al't under whieh plaintiff is s<><~king Jw•onrse has
to do with waters.
R0spondeut says thpse arP puhlic water:-;. If, then,
these are public '"atPrs, rPspond<>nt stan<!:-' in tlw peculiar
position of seeking to condemn private property for the
conveyaw·n of pnhlie water:-; in which plaintiff has absolutely no right, title, or interest.
Both positions a]'(~ wrong. 'l'lw water:-; are privately
owned s<>Pping mHl pen·olating wat<'rs within cvpry ddinition of' tlw lnw, an<l "~ithin tlw llll<''llliTa<li<'f<'d Pvi-
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dence in the case, and respondent i.s now seeking to
s·witch theories at this late date after having tried the
case upon the theory that they are privately owned
waters.
'\Vhen respondent offered Exhibit 36 (the filing
with the State Engineer) in evidence (Ab. 199-200) defendants objected upon the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and not germane to
any issue in the case; this upon the theory that a mere
filing meant nothing, and that the filing call<~d for capturing the waters upon respondent's own premises, and
hence outside of the issues in this case.
'l'he court thereupon called upon respondent to explain what it claimed for the papc~r. 'l'hen~upon 1\lr.
Parsons stated as follows:
''MR. PARSONS: It is an application to appropriate the waters of this stream and 1 would
say to your II onor that we do not predicate our
claim to title to these toaters upon any theor·y that
they are public waten; or within the jurisdiction
of the State Enrrineer. I am bringing out by this
witness that the purpose of this application was
simply to safeguard the plaintiff's property in
the event anybody or the State Engineer or the
Court might rule some day that these waters are
public ·waters within the State Engineer's jurisdiction and could be appropriated. I understand
th<~ State EngiiW<~r in one cas<~ involving copper
waters from these dumps has so held.
"I will say 1.'C~ry fmnkly that that is not our
throry of plaintiff's title. In o11r opinion th.cse
n·aters are not p·ublic tt''aters and are in no way
within the jurisdiction of the State Engineer."
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The court did not immediately rule upon the admissibility of the document, so respondent, in an attempt
to further justify the introduction in evidence of Exhibit
36 took further evidence, and Mr. Goodrich, chief engineer, testified (Ab. 201):

"\V" e do not believf~ that the State mngineer
has jurisdiction oV<\r waters of this C'haracter,''
etc.
~ir.

Goodrich further testified ('l'r. 644) that on the
day previous to giving this evidence thry had filed an
amendment to the application so as to d1angr th(~ point
of diversion. The filing had not ripened into any right,
and the comt (rrr. 690, Ab. 2o:3) snstai11Pd the objection
of defendants to the admissibility of tlw application for
any purpose in the ease, from whieh ruling respondtmt
rwver appPaled. Obviously thf~ eourt was right in sustaining the objection lweause the nH•re filing of an application mPans nothing in eontemplation of law as a
hasis of right, the tin1e to eontPst tlw sanw not having
expin~d, and the appli(·ation hdorn the allH'JH!nwnt was
fih•d had ahsolutl•ly uothing to do Kith the eas<'. In the
ahs<\nee, therPfore, of any s<•mhlance of right in any
public \YatPr, rt-sponflent chmw tlw thPor~, of private
water, whi<·h was ohviously eorreet.
This was n~sponflent's th<~ory during t!JP trial, and
we quote tlw following from "HespondPut's Bri<>f" at
page 11 to show that this was still their theory npou
appeal:
"It must lw fnrtlwr horne in mind that it is
not llw eontention of eitlwr part)' that any of the
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waters of Dixon Gulch are public waters or capable of appropriation."
Having therefore tried the case upon a theory of
private water and attempted to sustain the judgment
upon the theory of private water, respondent would
now in desperation seck to abandon that theory entirely
and shift to the theory of public \Yater after having expressly repudiated it, and notwithstanding the fact that
there is not a vestige of evidence of any title in the
plaintiff to any public water.
rrhe deeisions of this eourt are unanimous and uniform in holding that litigants cannot try cases upon one
theory and then shift theories upon appeal, partiwlarly
in a petition for rehearing.
H<~spondent

was right, however, in conteuding that
these \Yen~ privately owned wat<'rs, and the decision of
this comt was right in holding that these are seeping
and percolating waters, and the evidence of both partiPs
showed sueh to be the case. rt'here was not <~ven a <•onflict upon tlw qu<~stion. 'l'lw following (~XePrpts from the•
evidence presented by the [T tah Copp0r Company giv<> a
fair sample of what was provm1 by their own statements:
PARSONS (Ab. 72) : "And tah the> waters from
this dump as they seep down the bottom of that gnleh to
that portion of tlw ~'ll"fa<·<~ of d<,fendants' property ou
bedrock and above as a medium through which these>
wat<•rs percolate, for a conduit to eonvey these watPrs *"
SCIIIT~l~ING,

Mining Superintendent (All. 12!)):
"It is our theory that thPR<' watPrs eseap~~ from thP dmnp
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up above, and we intend to capture them some hundreds
of feet below in the Valentine Script." This water seeps
or finds a course through the railroad fill. (Ab. 1:30).
The course of the water is unknown.
H. C. GOODRICH, Chief Engineer (Ab. 136): "We
expect cPrtain of the water will percolate through the
portion of the land lying on the right hand side of the
gulch going up, and they should percolate through all
the railroad fill." It is my opinion the \Vaters come
through everywhere in all that area (Tract D). I know
of no other well defined channel than the entire Tract
D. (Ab. 141).

J ..J. BEASON, geologist (Ab. 501): rl'hese copper
solutions (~VPntually percolat<> through a SPuli-impPrviouR
s<>al at the toe of the dump. The waters percolate downward through that and into thE~ fill and ppn•olate out
through tlw fill, and th(~y n~acll the bottom of tlw gulch.
(A h. :l02). rrhis extends ano~s the entire Up\Yanl to<~
of the fill. I know of no particular chanrwl in which
theRe wat<>rs eonrse down through the fill. TheRe waters
are sPeping and p<~rcolating in the fill, in the soil bc>n<•ath tlw fill, aml above lH~drock. I observed the water
ywrcolation between bedrock and the collar of the raisP
in thP eatehment tmmE'l. (Ah. ;)03). That is the sanw
general eharader o!" wat<>r sc·C>pagn a]l(l percolation
which I bav<' desnilwd in m~· <•vidPlWe an<l iR tlw way
tlw wat<>r 1<>aves the dump and comes down to thP point
wher<' it aeenmnlatc>s for thP making of tlw lla~·s Rpri11p;.
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GEORGljj C. EARL (All. 463): I also believr that
the water is spread out over a considerable area. I do
not believe myself this \\'atPr comes down the bottom of
that gulch. (Ab. 464) By that I mean that the wat(~r
percolates lat(~rally as well as pc'rpendienlarly downward.
Defendants' witnesses were to the same effeet. They
all testified that if any solutions whatsoever arriv~01l
into defendants' ground from respondent's dump in
Dixon Gulch that it did so by seepage and percolation.
The occasional use of the~ word ''flow'' did not ehange
the eharacter of the water. 1\'o one ch~seribed any ehann(~l other than the entire gulch.
\Vith n~fc>renr(~ to the findings of fart rPferrPd to
on page 35 of n~spondent's pdition it will he ob~wrve<l
that plaintiff has italiri11ed the word "flowed" but has
entirely ignored the \vonl "percolated," which also appears in tlw findings.
Tlw ease of Chandlc>r \', Utah Copper Company has
absolutely nothing to do with this ease. 'l'hat was a clem·
examph~ of an und('J'gronnd stream, having all of thP
eharaeteristies of current, dinwnsion, banks, bed, and
eomingling of th<' waier partieles, which characterist.ies
an~, as stat<'d by the majority opinion in this case, entirely ahst>nt from this watc>r oreurrf'nee which the Utah
Copp<'r Company is sc(:kiug to takP. \Ve have ahen<l,::
diseussPd the so-C'alled Pxperiments by the pouring ()_·
water upon the dumps. 'l'his entire subject matter wn :
handlc>ll in appellants' rPply brief, em1mwneing at page
4!J.
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v.
Point V has been thrashed over so often that it
deserves no extended attention. It is noticeable that
plaintiff has the solemn presumption of manufacturing
its own fads and then quoting the alleged facts as authority. On page 4G this effort on the part of the plaintiff to support the plaintiff occurs. "The dump has
been frequently described as a huge spong~~ or reservoir." By \Yhom "? All of this talk about artificial produetion amounts only to this, that defendants threw out
in the gulches a lot of material that they ~wanted to get
rid of and the rains descended and the floods came.
'l'hey would have come and descended had the plaintiff
never done anything. And as time passed on coppN
solutions appeared, and now the plaintiff contends that
the produet is an artificial and manufactured one. It
might just as well be contended by the eity administration that tlw gases from the municipal garbage heap art>
artificial increments added to the atmosphc•re. This
~whole matter is discussed at the following places in
briefs heretofore filed and then~ is nothing in the discussion under this point in plaintiff's petition for n~
hearing that is in any way nmv, interesting, or convincing: "Respondent's Reply," pagc•s lG-18, 22-2i), "Appellants' ll<'ply to Respondt>nt 's Reply," pages 1-12.
Tlw nitieism of the opinion of thc~ eomt that thc~
statement in the majority opinion that the plaintiff has
auclPu no wat<~r to Dixon Gulch is childish and inaccurate. \Yhat the court manifestly mPmls is tl1at the
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plaintiff has brought no nevv stream of water into the
water shed in Dixon Gulch. It has no reference to the
piddling experiments performed by the plaintiff during
the course of the trial and referred to on page 43 in tlw
petition for rehearing.
A complete reversal of the position of the plaintiff
will also be noticed on the question of whether or not
there were always waters in Dixon Gulch. On the trial
plaintiff insisted that Dixon Gulch was bone dry until
plaintiff established its dump, and thPn the dump becamP a res<>rvoir. Now plain tiff takes the position that
waters have always flowed in Dixon Gulch. It is interesting to note the inconsistency of the position that there
have always been waters in Dixon Gulch, with the former suggestion that th<~ waters all originate in the
dump. 'l'h<> truth of the matter is that there was always
some water in Dixon Gnleh, both b<~fore and since tlw
dump has he<m established, and it is also true that tlw
plaintiff has added no new water to Dixon Gulch. The
dumping of waste material by the plaintiff in Dixon
Gulch has slowed up the runoff, but the total amount of
water has not been incn~ased by mw drop.
For the purpose of this point counsel for respondent s<~eks to shift theories by blandly stating now smnething which they have hen~tofore denied, to-wit, that
there wen~ "·aters in Dixon Gulch before respondent's
dumps wen~ placed thc>n~, and htmce all of the waters in
Dixon Gulch and within •rracts C and D could not possibly han~ come from their dump. vVe beg leave to quote
tll<' foll<w;ing from Mr. Parsons (Ab. 206):
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"MR. PARSONS : (Tract D is a natural
channel) For conveying the water from our dump.
I will concede, if there be any-I cannot conceive
of the possibility of being any waters that do not
come from our dump-if there be any we cannot
take them in this proceeding.''

It therefore seems to us that counsel, by admitting
the facts stated in the argument upon this point, and by
relying thereon-trying to draw the cloak of developed
water over themselves-that they admit having played
a trick upon the trial court, which found as a fact-but
which was not a faet-upon the insistence of respondent,
that all the waters in Dixon Gulch come from the dump.
By making this argument they bring themselves
squarely within thn doctrine relating to comingled waters
discussed by defendants in'' Brief for Appellants,'' eommencing at page 128.

VI.
Under this point the plaintiff again att(•mpts to
mislead the eourt as to the exad nature of Tracts C and
D and as to the position whic-h the defendants have>
alu:ays tak(m as to the::w trac·ts. 'rraets C and D are
ncecssary, vital, and indispensable to the activity of the
deft>ndants if they are to have any use of their property
in Dixon Gulch. This Tract C is tlH~ plae(• wh~\re all
waters passing through Tract D arc gathered into respondent's pipeline. (See the Pvidenee of Chief I1~ngi
HPC'r Goodrieh, Abs. 146). 'J'ract C is not necess,ary to
plaintiff. The drain tunnrl wat(\l'S can be piped acros:,;
'l'raet D and taken into the pipelinP on Trac·t H thu
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same as the waters from Tract A after amendment of
the complaint requesting such right as heretofore granted by this court, so as to avoid the comingling of defendants' and plaintiff's waters on Tract C. The same
thing is true with regard to the pipeline over Tracts A
and B which convey waters from outside the drainagf~
area in Dixon Gulch. The defendants have no objection
to the plaintiff condemning Tract A, except that the
plaintiff cannot Hnder the guise of condemning Tract A
dump the U)aters from the pipe on Tract A into the catchment at Tract C, and then claim plaintiff's waters from
T'ract A and defendants' waters making in Tracts C and
D with which they would be mingled, when it is entirely
possible and just as con11enient for the plaintiff to continue its pipe down the .rJulch instead of dumping at catchment C. Defendants have no objection to plaintiff conveying waters from the drain tunnel and from outside the
drainage area of Dixon Gnlch through pipes which enclose such water before entering plaintiff's property
down to the mouth of Dixon Gulch, but they do ohjeet to
plaintiff misleading the court as to the character of Tract
C and Tract D. These tracts are ahsolntc:>ly indispensable
to the exereise of defendants' rights. Dc:>fendants cannot
collect the waters in any other place than in these tracts.
They were purposely selected because they are the only
places that defendants' waters may be collected in Dixon
Gulch. They are not at all essential to the plaintiff except as their use would absolutely destroy the possibility
of the defendants collecting their own copper solutions.
'l'he opinion of the P<mrt on this point is correct.
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VII.
As far as point seven is eoncerned there is so murh
error and so little facts or law in it, and there is so
much of an att0mpt to lead the court into possible future
contingenries not no\v before the court that the discussion thereof is premature and futile, to say the
least. The suit for condemnation is an entirety, and is
conclusive upon the issues presented, namely, as to
whether Trarts C and D can he rondemned for the purposes claimed. If it operates at all it operates from the
dah~ of its filing. 'J'he wPircl suggestion that while the
action of the court may be right in denial of the plaintiff's right to condemn 'J'ract D for the collection of
solutions up to the clatP of filing rPspondc~nt 's petition
for rehearing that such a conclusion should in no wa~
affect the right of the plaintiff to collect solutions in
'l'ract D for the next hundred years, has the prize for
originality. 'Phe suggestion that the court has pointed
out how the plaintiff may legally arctuin~ 'J'nwt D is inaccurate. No one has ever contended that as to bon<'
dry ground the plaintiff may not rondemn sneh gron11d
through \vhieh to run a ditch or in which to lay a pipe to
ronvey coppt~r solutions from plaintiff's dump to it:-<
prPeipitating plant. But this view do<~s not originatP
with the Supreme Court. ThPre is nothing novel or nPw
about it. Such a usc of Dixon Guleh is already heinr~·
ma(le as far as 'J'rad A and tlw drain tunnel waters arc
eoneerrH•d, lmt it is when tlw plaintiff eontends for a
right to coll('ct thP d<'fC'1Hlants' coppN ;.;olntions in t1l<'
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defendants' premises without paying for their value or
to prevent the defendants from collecting such solutions
by occupying the only ground in which they can be collected without paying for the damage plaintiff wonlrl
then~by do, that objection is made.
It is not true that the only issue raised is as to the
right of respondent to condemn the land of the defendants. ']'he further answer and counterclaim of defendants is eontained in paragraph XXXIII, stating among
other things as follows :

" * * * that the said plaintiff is now appropriating·
and taking waters belonging to this defendant and for a
period of about two weeks prior to the comnwncmnent of
this action has so talwn the same, ·without dcfL'IHlauts'
consent and to the damage of this defendant to the extent of several thousand dollars, and for all of which
said vYatm·s containing copper in solution taken and appropriated or h<~reaftpr taken and appropriated by the
plaintiff from this defendant, the defendant demand~~
an aerounting and payment for the value of such copp<'l'
in solution, as a part of d<~fendants' further damages."
(Abs. 63) 'rlw prayer of the answer properly demanded
affirmatin) relief. \rlwther this allegation and prayer
amounts to a counterclaim is not now before this eourt,
but the reeord shows affirmatively that it was treated by
the parties and Hw b·i:1l eonrt as a emmtereiaim, and it
c0rtainly contaius all of th<~ elements of a cause of action
for unlawfully taking dPfendants' waters and if deJ'ici<~nt in any respert is subject to the same right of
aJJJendiJWnt as is aerordnd to respondent. The rrwmor-
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andum opinion of thE~ trial judge contains the follmving:
"Because of the contention of the defendants to the effect that they are entitled to an accounting of all thP
waters collected by plaintiff during the pendency of the
suit ·whether the sonree thereof is in plaintiff's dump
or not, this expression of the opinion of the court is
voiced at this point," etc., ete., (Abs. 589). It is quite
evident that the trial court regarded the pleading of dE~
fendants as a counterclaim demanding an accounting of
values taken by respondent.

It is a new contention that a condemnation snit
which has no merit and in "·hich the eondPmrwr has been
required to file a bond and in which the defendants aft0r
denying the plaintiff's right to eondenm, ask for damages because of the unlawful taking of defPndants' property, are confined in the action merely to a determinn
tion of the issue as to ·whether or not there is a right
to condemn. Respondent says, ''title to waters presento-~
no issue in the present aspect of this case." (Petition
for rehearing, page 58). From the V(~ry start the qn0stion of title to waters was insisted upon as the is~nw. In
his opening statement and in the statenH-mts of issues
which oeemTed thereafter at the very outset, on page 7D
of the ahstraet, ·will be found a statement by eounsel of
respondent as follows: "That qm~stion must be determined by the court. If vve do not own that wat(~r tlwre
I do not know very well how \YC eould take theirs." On
page 89 of the abstraet will be found the following remarks by the same counsf~l: ''They (the defendants)
have rais(•d this issue, this is in their pl(•adings, they
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have set out as a defense to the action in challenging
our right to condemn, that these waters we seek to recover are theirs, and that we have no property there to
recover. * * * Now, in calling upon your Honor to determine those questions, incidentally your Honor will
pass upon the title, of course, which we submit is a
question for the court and not a question for a jury, that
once your Honor has determined that question, the issue
can then readily be framed, that is to ultimately go to
the jury, but once determined by the court, of course the
jury will not be called upon again to determine it.'' To
whieh counsel for the defendants replied: "That is exactly what I thought; the question they are trying to
present to your Honor and have your Honor dc•termine
is the facts as to title.''
The~ suggestion that plaintiff may as a physical
possibility capture~ solutions in its own dump, is an inten~sting one hut not a legal one in this casP, and is
probably intended to disturb someone. rrhis adion has
only to do with the right of respondcmt to take defendants' property for the purpose of rapturing waters at
that point.

VIII.

It seems to us that the insertion of this point is
rather a belated effort on the part of respondent to injed a Fc~deral question into the case in the hope that
this ''bogeyman'' might tcmd to frighten someone.
As we~ understand this attemptc~d point it is: That
sine<' clc•fpndants did not sePk to qnic~t title by way of
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counterclaim that the question of title was not in the
case, and this court having found title to these waters to
be in defendants, such finding has no foundation in the
pleadings and is null and void; and hence subject to
reversal by some Federal court to which respondent
threatens to appeal if this court does not conform to
respondent's desires. Apparently counsel for respondent
thinks that the only cases in which the question of title
to property is presented are suits to quiet title. Title is
involved in practically every case involving propert~·
rights, and is particularly involved in condemnation
cases where defendants question the right to condemn
and in this case title is in isstw because the \Vaters for
which plaintiff is seeking a ditch right do not belong
to the condemner, and here also the condemner is SPE~k
ing, without compensation or damages, to take \Vaters
belonging to defendants.
'rhe question of title is squarely within the issues
presented by the pleadings. It was raised in paragraph
XI, XII, XIII of the answer, and in the further answer
and eounterc~laim in paragraph XXXIII; togdher also
with the various denials sc~t forth in <lE~fendants' answPI'
(Ab. 42-64).
'rhc~ question of title was the first thing we ran into
in the trial of the~ case, plaintiff insisting that the question of title was one for the court, and def(~ndants, on
tlw other hand, insisting that they were entitled to a
jury trial; and both parties agreeing that it was the
paramount issue in the ease. (Ab. 76-92) Aftpr having
insistPd that the qm~stion of title to thc'se \YatPrs \\'as
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included within the matters and things to be found by
the court as a necessary element under the statute, it
comes with rather poor grace at this late date to urge
that the court transcended the issues in determining
title. A typical example of counsel's contention is contained at page 79 of the abstract:
''MR. PARSONS:
My notion about this
thing is our opponents are entitled to a jury trial
only upon one question, that is the question of
damages, the value of the right-of-way and the
damage to the ground due to the taking. The
q1testion of the title of the water I think goes to
the right of eminent domain. That question must
be detennined by the court. If we do not owr~ that
water the1·e I do not know 11ery well hmP we co1tld
take theirs."
In fact both parties
mount issue in the ease.

agn~ed

that this '''as the para-

The suggestion on pagc; G4 that mrhat court could
properly indulge only om~ presumption, namely, that
plaintiff would do whatever might be necessary to preserve its title as its eopper solutions crossed the boundary behn~en the respective propc~rties of the parties to
this actio11, that with the changing times and conditions
ami metallurgical processes waters and chemical solutions from new sources might, and in all probability
wonld, be sprayed upon plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch
and that it was reasonablc~ to presume that th(~ easement
sought to be condemned across Tract C not only could,
but would be used for the purpose for "\vhich it was to be~
c•oJHlPnuwd, nanwly, thC' tnmsportation of coppc•r Roln-
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tions produced by plaintiff in plaintiff's reduction works
by whatever process or processes the then state of the
art might indicate, and that therefore, the judgment
should be affirmed,'' should he set off against the equally emphatic statement of respondent in respondent's
reply to appellants' reply, page 6, ~where it is stated that
"plaintiff cannot in the case at bar drive a tunnel heneath the top of bedrock to intercept by its raise and
wings plaintiff's copper solutions at plaintiff's boundary, because such diverting structures under the circumstances there existing would not only be prohibitive m
initial cost but would be impossible of maintenanrP at
any cost.''
Respondent blows hot and eold upon this issue, as
it has upon practically <~very other issue in the case. If
their good faith is questioned upon the ground that it
will be a simple matter for them to take their O\Yn water
upon their own lands and premises and leave the lands
and premises of the d<~fendants alone, they say it is an
impossibility to collect their own waters upon their own
lands and premises. On Uw otlwr hand, if they desire
to argue our good faith in seeking to capture these waters, they state that it will be a "mere gesture" for 1h<'m
to shut the solutions off.
In faee of this assertion of physical impossibilit~
to collPd <'Opper solutions in plaintiff's dump, plaintiff's
own theory under point eight and at other places in
plaintiff's brief that the court will not require the mere
"gesture" of a compliance with the law, dissolves into
thin air. H is Pmphatieally 11ot tme, as tlu• respond<•nt
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has stated in its petition on page 65 that "This case war:
tried on the theory that if there were no solutions other
than those defendants had alleged were coming to the
surface at the Hays Spring out of the synclinal basin
from subterranean sources,'' etc. '11 he case was tried on
that theory and also on the theory that wherever the
waters came from when they reached defendants' lands,
if collected by defendants, they belonged absolutely to
d(~fendants.

'rhe two Utah cases

ref(~rred

to on page 65 of

Respondent's Petition are in no way in point. In the
case at G6 Utah G3 it was held that \vlwre the right to
condemn is sustained, that in such action

th(~ d(~fendant

may not recover judgnwnt on a eounterelaim for an independent

tn~spass

eornmitted by the condemner prior

to the condemnation proct•edings. In the speond caS(' at

22 Utah 4:3, it was held that where an aetion is brought
for an injunetion to restrain a trespass, the trPspass may
not be justified on the ground that it was em1m1ittc•d for
a public purpose or that a right of condemnation ex'isted unexercised in the trespasser, and that condemnation may not

b(~

prayt-d for in a eonnterelaim in sueh

action. It seems to us manifest that the principle of these
cas(~S

does not apply where, as in this ease, the right to

condemn is denied and there remains, therefore, nothing
for the eonrt to do hut to assess tlw damagP donp hy thP
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condemner during his unwarranted and unlawful possession of the premises of the defendants. If respondent
by these two cases is attempting to mah the point that
a counterclaim of this kind is not properly pleadable in
this action, then we respectfully suggest that there is a
proper way for respondent to raise that -point in the trial
court, and if the ruling is not satisfactory to respondent
they have a right of appeal u-pon that question. This
particular phase of the case is not now before this court.
'l'he only point whieh is raised is as to whether the question of title was within the issues raised hy the pleadings
and as to this we respectfully urge that it was within
the issues raised by the am;wer, furtlwr answer, and
eounterclaim.
rrhe authorities

qnoh~d

on pagl's 67 to 70 that the

eourt is bound in its determination to the isstws raisc>d
in the pleadings have no point in this case as herdofore
poi11ted out. 'l'he plaintiff sought to eondenm and defendants

deui(~d

the right to eondemn and asked for

damages because of the unlawful taking of the eoppcr
solutions owned hy the defendants. All of thc>sc issues
were properly in the pleadings and eovcn•d by the judgment of thl' trial court and properly eovpred by a reversal of the determination of tht" trial court and a remanding of the action for a determination of the (lamage
don(~

thc> dPfcndants.
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IN e respectfully submit that notwithstanding the
disappointment of our brothers on the other side, the
conclusion reached by the court in the carefully considered opinion filed in this case was the only one that
could be reached in accordance with the facts and the
la,v, and that the petition for rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

BADGER, RICH & RICH ancl
BADGER & LOvVRY,
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants.

